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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-ooo-
cRANE COMPANY dba CRANE 
SUPPLY COMPANY I 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
KEN DAHLE I MARV ERICKSON I 
EARL ZARBOCK, PLUMBERS 
SUPPLY COMPANY, ALAN MASER, 
MARJIE SADLER, and DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants-
Respondents • 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Civil No. 15022 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks a modification of the judgment in 
its favor which denied appellant the bulk of its claimed 
damages. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried without jury before the Honor-
able Bryant H. Croft beginning on July 131 1976. The lower 
court held in favor of appellant but limited recovery to the 
value of two sales diverted by respondents. Judgment was 
granted only as against respondents Dahle, Maser, Erickson 
and Plumbers Supply, and not against respondents Zarbock and 
Sadler. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a finding of error in the lowE: 
court's failure to find a conspiracy among 11 a respondent, 
to injure appellant. Appellant also seeks to have this 
Court define and apply the proper measure of damages whi: 
should include all losses suffered by appellant as a rest: 
of respondents' actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On April 30, 1976 respondents Dahle, Maser, Eq 
and Sadler virtually simultaneously (and by prior arransq 
each terminated their employment with appellant. Prior 4 
their actual termination, respondent Dahle before the enc 
of March of 1976 (Tr. 1-50) negotiated for employmentwit 
and was accepted by respondents Plumbers Supply and Zarbo: 
as the water works manager for Plumbers Supply (Tr. 1·50), 
As early as April 23, 1976 (Tr. 1-58) Dahle negotiated,orJ 
and placed in the name of respondent Plumbers Supply water 
works materials and inventory for the account of PlU!llbers 
Supply. Testimony on behalf of appellant showed the val>Ji 
of such inventory to be in excess of $300,000.00. Throu~t 
the period in question Dahle participated in the projectJC 
of appellant's sales and the orders of inventory based UfC: 
such projections. (Tr. 1-60) 
Prior to April 30, 1977 each of the employee r:~ 
dents, agreed and permitted respondent Plumbers SupplY to:: 
1 S2) anno•' a notice to each of appellant's customers (Tr. -
'I 
f th f employee res[ a "new phone number" where all o e ormer 
-2-
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could be reached who would continue "the same fine service" 
(Exhibit Pl-2). And that announcement was mailed prior to 
April 30. (Tr. 1-54) 
During the course of the trial, the Court was pre-
sented with and received evidence of overt acts alleged to 
have been committed in the course an~nce·of the con-
spiracy among respondents. It was established that the duties 
of respondent Dahle encompassed ordering and checking of 
water works inventory (Tr. 1-6) and that he had sales super-
visory responsibility over respondents Erickson and Maser 
(Tr. 1-7) involving 90 percent responsibility over water 
oorks sales and maybe 10 percent plumbing industrials (Tr. 
1-7 ). Mr. Dahle's job description was contained within 
appellant's manual of operating procedures (Exhibit Pl-l.P) 
~d as such his duties and responsibilities were well defined. 
Mr. Dahle was responsible for preparation of sales books con-
taining historical information of appellant's customers (Tr. 
1-48) and he had access to a master print out containing the 
names and addresses of each and every of appellant's customers. 
Explicit procedures were maintained by appellant for preparing 
and cataloging bids for future work and such bids were kept by 
respondent Sadler (Tr. 1-12) 
It is undisputed that respondents took with them or 
destroyed the sales books used by respondents Erickson and Maser 
(3-75), dumped a print-out in a garbage can ( 2-75 ), left 
-3-
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the catalogues in the warehouse, and that such documents,, 
required by appellant to maintain its business. Judge Croi. 
found that the action of respondents justified the issuanc, 
of the temporary restraining order previously issued by Ju: 
Sawaya. 
At least as early as "around the end of March,, 
could have been a little sooner ... " (Tr. 1-50) respond!: 
Dahle contacted respondent Zarbock and thereafter had three 
or four meetings (Tr. 1-56) relating to the possibility of 
Dahle being employed by respondent Plumbers Supply. Dahle 
then advised respondents Erickson, Maser and Sadler of "a 
possibility of employment with defendant Plumbers Supply" 
:?robably about the first week of April (Tr. 1-51). Dahle~ 
Zarbock prepared and Erickson, Maser and Sadler approved tl:; 
notice of the change in employment (Tr. 1-51) and the same 
was mailed to some if not all of appellant's customers on 
rhursday, April 29 (Tr. 1-54) or the day before the Dahle, 
Zrickson, Maser and Sadler gave notice of termination (Tr. 
Dahle made arrangements on behalf of Plumbers Supply for 
stocking and inventory of each of the six lines of water wo 
materials set out in the announcement (Tr. 1-57) and placed 
purchase orders on behalf of Plumbers Supply Company prior 
11 t One purch to termination of his employment with appe an . 
order is indisputably dated April 23, 1976 (Tr. 1-58)' and 
· g the 
other orders were negotiated at prices in effect dunn 
month of April. (Tr. 1-59) 
-4-
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In the course of conversations between Dahle and 
zarbock, Dahle projected sales for the months of May and June, 
1976 of $180,000.00 to $200,000.00 (Tr. l-60). Despite the 
issuance of a temporary restraining order, respondent 
Plumbers Supply Company came to within 60 to 65 percent of 
t;;1ese projections. 
During Dahle's employment at appellant, he alone was 
responsible for preparing projections relating to the water 
works business of its Salt Lake City Branch (Tr. 2-25). 
Dahle was aware of the instructions of appellant's management 
to keep inventory down (Tr. 2-26). During the course of his 
activities he found that 30 to 60 days was fairly typical lead 
time in ordering inventory (Tr. 2-46). 
Despite the fact that Plumbers Supply had not pre-
viously been in the water works business, the projections pre-
pared by Dahle for Zarbock approximated appellant's normal 
sales (Tr. 3-34). With experienced personnel it would take a 
new venture at least 90 days to attain sales figures that were 
projected by respondent, Plumbers Supply Co. (Tr. 3-35). 
Inexperienced personnel would require at least one year to 
attain such sales levels. In order for Plumbers Supply 
to sell the amounts of materials actually sold in May and 
June, a normal inventory of two month's supply or more would 
be required (Tr. 3-38). Plumbers Supply would have had to 
place orders for approximately $300,000.00 of inventory in 
-5-
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order to project and meet its expected sales. 
Appellant has calculated its damages with refer-
ance to its 26 water works accounts which represented 4l.J 
precent of its total sales through the first four months 
of 1976. (Tr. 3-4 3} • In May the precentage dropped from t 
average of 41 percent to 7.4 percent. (Tr. 3.43}. Appellar 
contrc.ller testified to a two months loss of $39,690.00 
and that the projected loss to Crane would be $130,000.00 
(Tr. 3-45}. 
It is undisputed that on April 20 the Bountiful 
City Water Department placed with the appellant an order for 
200 meter boxes and 50 boxes were received on April 29. 
(Tr. 3-68}. After inquiry was made by Bountiful of Dahle at 
his "new phone number" at Plumbers Supply, Bountiful was ad· 
vised that the same were not back-ordered at appellant's 
facility and that the boxes could be delivered out of Pl~~ 
Supply inventory that day (Tr. 3-67}. Bountiful's expectatii 
was that the meters would be delivered in two shipments and 
that the remaining 150 would come from appellant as soon as 
they got them (Tr. 3-71}. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING A CONSPIRACY 
BY RESPONDENTS. 
The trial court awarded appellant limited damages 
-6-
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against all respondents except Zarbock and Sadler after finding 
tha respondents Dahle and Maser did ne-t-aa*~de-:r the---1.5.0 
~!?.ordered by Bountiful with the result that appellant 
could not supply them and said order was subsequently diverted 
to Plumbers Supply. Additionally, the acts of Maser in diverting 
a valve order were similarly held compensable against the 
foregoing respondents. (Findings p. 3) 
The Memorandum Decision of the court however concluded 
that the acts of diversion constituted the only basis for 
money damages and that the evidence would not support any 
finding that respondents were involved in a conspiracy to 
defraud appellant of its customers or business. (Me. Decision 
p. 5 and 3 respectively). 
It is submitted that the foregoing findings and 
decision are inconsistent in law and in fact since the 
gravamen of appellant's case is the participation by all 
respondents in overt acts carried out in the course and 
furtherance of a conspiracy to injure appellant in its busi-
ness and that appellant in fact was injured in its business. 
Having found the existence of at least two over,Jt 
acts by Dahle and Maser and the complicity in such acts by 
Plumbers Supply, the court could not as a ma~t_e_r __ o:(__l~w 
Since 
both the shipment of 150 meters and the taking of a valve 
order by Plumbers supply (an unrelated third party competitor) 
-7-
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would have been lawful acts but for the "breaches f 
o respor,. 
sibili ty" by Dahle and Maser, the court must have inferred 
and imputed the liability of Dahle and Maser to Plumbers s~ 
in granting a joint judgment against those parties. 
In DeVries v. Brumbeck, 53 Cal.2d 643, 2 Cal. Rpt 
764, 349 P.2d 532 (1960) the relationship between proof of 
conspiracy and the award of a joint judgment was explained 
as follows: 
In tort the major significance of the con-
spiracy lies in the fact that it renders each 
participant in the wrongful act responsible 
as a joint tort-feasor for all damages ensuing 
from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not 
he was a direct actor and regardless of his 
activity. 349 P.2d at 536. 
In Schaefer v. Bernstein, 140 Cal. App.2d 278, 
295 P.2d 113 (1956), the court similarly held: 
A plaintiff is entitled to a joint recovery 
of damages against such defendants as he c~ 
show have united or cooperated in inflicting 
a wrong upon him. 295 P.2d at 123. 
The tort of "diversion", if indeed it is a separa~ 
tort, was neither pleaded by appellant nor acknowledged by ti 
court to be in the case. At no time during the course of 
trial did either the court or ~ respondents seek to limit 
or strike the testimony of particular respondents relating 
to the alleged conspiracy and such testimony was received as 
against all defendants. Accordingly, the only subs tan~ 
ld have he: basis for the court's award of a joint judgment wou ~
to have been upon finding that a conspiracy was proven~ 
-a-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that plaintiff was damaged as a result thereof. 
POINT II 
THE FACTS CONTAINED IN THE RECORD ARE SUFFICIENT 
TO SHOW THAT THE RESPONDENTS CONSPIRED TO INJURE APPELLANT 
IN VIOLATION OF THEIR FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
Under the present Utah case law the Findings of 
Fact and the inferenc~which can be drawn from the evidence 
fully support the conclusion that the respondents conspired 
to injure the appellant in violation of their fiduciary duty 
to the appellant. The trial below was made to the court, 
therefore this Court has the right to review all aspects of 
the record as to inferences and conclusions drawn from the 
evidence in the court below therein. It is submitted that 
me evidence in the court below compels the conclusion that 
the employee-respondents had a fiduciary obligation of loy-
alty during the time they were employed by appellant which 
continued thereafter as long as they possessed proprietary 
information. This fiduciary obligation required that the 
respondent employees conduct themselves so as to not cause 
injuries to appellant. 
In the case of Hoggan & Hall & Higgens, Inc. v. 
~, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1969), this court faced a 
case very similar to the instant one. In the Hoggan case 
-9-
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key employees and officers of the employer therein di-
verted business from the employer to themselves, and while 
still working for the employer, set up a competing company, 
They thereafter resigned from the employer and entered into 
direct competition to the detriment of their former employe: 
This Court held that those actions constituted a breach of 
the fiduciary duty owed by an employee to his employer and 
consequently upheld an award of damages to the employer. 
In the instant case, respondents conspired to the detriment 
of their employer, appellant herein. 
The explanation of an employee 1 s fiduciary duty 
given in Duane Jones Company, Inc. v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 
117 N.E.2d 237 (1954) was cited with strong approval by this 
Court in the Hoggan case, supra. In Duane Jones Company, ke, 
employees of plaintiff 1 s advertising business conspired to a: 
actually solici tated customers of their employer, created a 
competing corporation and diverted business to that corporat: 
The defendants also convinced several key employees to resi~: 
from employment with the plaintiff and to work for the defeni 
ant 1 a competitor. Even though the customers of the plainti: 
were not contrac:tually bound and were free to cancel their 
agreement with plaintiff at any time 1 the Court granted jud9· 
ment for plaintiff in the form of damages 1 including profits 
lOSt by the plaintiff becaUSe Of the defendantS I actionS, 
The court described the duty of the defendants as follows: 
-10-
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"The inferences reasonably to be drawn 
from the record justify the conclusion 
. . . that the individual defendants -
appellants, while employees of plaintiff 
corporation, determined upon a course of 
conduct which, when subsequently carried 
out, resulted in benefit to themselved 
through destruction of plaintiff's busi-
ness, in violation of the fiduciary 
duties of good faith and fair dealing 
imposed on defendants by their close re-
lationship with plaintiff corporation." 
117 N.E.2d at 245. 
In the Hoggan case, supra, this Court defined with 
substantial certainty the standard the defendants were required 
to meet in the instant case: 
"It is difficult to go along with the 
urgence that there is no solicitation 
of the accounts or that there was no 
breach of a confidential relation with 
the corporation under such circumstances, 
particularly when Hall and Higgins ad-
mitted in the record that they had on at least 
one occasion solicited one of the accounts 
to obtain its future business. This of it-
self confesses a tort." 414 P.2d at 91 
The cause of action pleaded and proven during the 
course of the trial was injury to the business of appellant 
through various improper acts of the respondents, including 
the diversion of particular items of business, interference 
with appellant's business ability and by direct competition 
with appellant. Having found diversion and collective action, 
the trial court nevertheless failed to find for appellant on 
the question of conspiracy and declined to grant to appellant 
the damage which may be proven by any number of definite 
actions, conditions, and circumstances occasioned by the broad 
conspiracy alleged. It is settled law that: 
-11-
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''A conspiracy may be inferred from the 
nature of the actions done, the rela-
tionships of the parties and the int-
erests of the alleged conspirators and 
other.circurnstances." Horn v. Ruess, 
72 ArH. 132, 231 P.2d 756 (1951). 
A conspiracy has also been described as being: 
"Merely a combination of two or more 
persons to accomplish an evil or un-
lawful purpose." Southern California 
Disinfecting Company, supra, at 54. 
Each of the common elements of civil conspiracy 
are supported by the findings of the court below. These 
elements are set out in Lockwood Grader Corp. v. Bockhaus, :. 
Colo. 339, 270 P.2d 193 (1954): 
"To constitute a civil conspiracy there must 
be: 
(1) one or more persons, and for this purpose 
a corporation is a person; 
(2) an object to he accomplished; 
(3) a meeting of the mind on the subject 
or course of action; 
(4) one or more unlawful overt acts; and 
( 5) damages as the proximate result thereof." 
(270 P.2d at 196). 
In applying these elements to Judge Croft's findil: 
and to the record, the following elements can be establishec 
1. Two or more persons. At least Dahle, Maser, 
Erickson, Zarbock and Plumbers Supply acted in combination. 
Since Zarbock was president and sole owner of Plumbers suppi 
all acts of the company were by him. 
2. 1 · h d There were at An object to be accomp lS e . 
the very least two i terns diverted by respondents from appeL 
hl' 
ant's business prior to the terminating of respondents oa · 
-12- d 
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Erickson, Maser and Sadler from appellant's employment, 
all as found by the Court. This activity strongly suggests 
the object of the conspiracy to be the destruction of app-
ellant's ability to compete with respondents in their sub-
sequent employment; 
3. A meeting of the minds. Employee-respondents 
Dahle, Maser, Erickson and Sadler collectively left the employ 
of appellant in accord with a prior agreement among themselves 
~d with respondentsPlumbers Supply and Zarbock. They per-
formed collective actions contrary to the interests of 
appellant. For example, the respondents agreed to the use 
of an announcement publicizing their new employment and 
agreed upon a common resignation date; 
4. One or more unlawful acts. Several unlawful 
overt acts were found by the court and the record supports 
the following additional acts and incidents which occurred 
prior and subsequent to respondents' termination of employ-
ment with appellant: 
a. The respondents established a busi-
ness directly competing with appellant, in breach 
of their fiduciary obligation to appellant as defined 
in the Hoggan case. 
b. Respondents' conversion and destruction of 
documents and records belonging to appellant, as shown 
in the record, constituted an unlawful act in breach 
-13-
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of their duty to the appellant. 
Southern California Disinfecting Company v. Lomkin, 
183 Cal. App.2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43, 53 (1960). 
c. In addition to the destruction and con-
version of documents of appellant, the respondents 
used or rendered useless records and documents of 
the appellant to further their own business interests. 
This has been held to be an improper action on the 
part of a former employee. Abbott Redmont Thinlite 
Corporation v. Redmont, 475 F.2d 85 (2nd Cir. 1973). 
The. court in that case stated: 
"The use of specific information on deals 
in progress obtained while in Abbott's 
employ, and the degree of likelihood that 
but for Redmont's competition Abbott would 
have been awarded the contract, dictate 
our holding that Redmont violated his fi-
duciary obligations to Abbott by submitting 
competing bids." (emphasis by the court) 
475 F.2d at 89. 
d. It is undisputed that all respondents re-
viewed and permitted the delivery of a notice to app-
ellant's customers stating that the employee respondents 
had a "new phone number" and would continue to provide 
"the same fine service". The solicitation of many, 
if not all, of appellant's customers occurred before 
the respondents had even left the employ of appellant. 
This type of solicitation by employees in contemplation 
of setting up their own business is a breach of the 
-14-
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employees' fiduicary duty to the employer. Equip-
ment Advertiser, Inc. v. Harris, 136 N.W.2d 302 
(Minn. 1965). 
e. Zarbock invested approximately $300,000 
in the new venture without any independent market 
study or pre-testing of the market. He also anti-
cipated impending sales to be equal to those of 
appellant although appellant had been in the market 
many years. These facts alone require the conclusion 
that Zarbock would have been unwilling to take such 
serious risks unless he had the assistance and assur-
ance of someone like respondent Dahle, who undoubtedly 
rendered such assistance while he was still employed 
by appellant. Dahle's assistance to Zarbock in direct 
competition with appellant violated Dahle's duty of 
loyalty to appellant as his employer. 
f. Dahle made a statement (found proven by 
the lower court) to the effect that if respondent 
Sadler were retained beyond April 30, 1976, she 
might divert business to Plumbers Supply. This was 
in furtherance of the conspiracy of respondents and 
in violation of her fiduciary obligation to appellant. 
g. Dahle gave advice in negotiation with 
suppliers on behalf of Plumbers Supply relating to 
purchases for inventory at a time when Dahle was 
expected to maintain and control the inventory of 
appellant, resulting in dual conduct. In this dual 
-15-
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role, Dahle apparently established equal inven-
tory positions between appellant and its then 
unknown competitor, Plumbers Supply, to cover 
all of the same market and directed at the same 
potential customers. The court in Southern Cali-
fornia Disinfecting Company, supra, found similar 
actions by an employee, who solicited his employer's 
customers and assisted a future employer to establish 
a competing business whilt still in the employ of 
his original employer, to be improper. The court 
found that these actions constituted unfair com-
petition. The court stated: 
"That the privilege of competition is limited 
by the nature of things by a legal standard 
of fairness to the method of competition and 
the motive of the competitor. Any abuse of 
the privilege is the basis for imposeing lia-
bility. Standards change as public policy 
changes with reference to competition in 
business as business is modified by social 
and economic conditions; however, deception 
has always been and is now recognized as bad 
conduct." 7 Cal. Rptr. at 53. 
The respondent Dahle's actions here at least constitute 
unfair competition and deception in violation of his duty 
to appellant. 
5. Damages. Damages as found by the lower court 
· · ns oi 
were limited to the loss occasioned by the two d~verslO 
d In add ; tion, there orders by respondents, foun as proven. • 
4 which a!' 
are further damages as explained above under No. ' 
compensable under Utah law. This is more fully discussed 
in Point III below. 
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The court's thesis that the same results 
would have occurred regardless of what the four employee 
respondents might have done after leaving appellant ignores 
the court's own conclusion on the record after questioning 
the witness, Stinson; (III 52-19). 
"The Court: 
If these four people had been wiped out 
in an accident, the result would have 
been the same, wouldn't it, as far as 
your sales are concerned? 
The Witness: 
Are you asking me for my opinion, if they 
would be wiped out? 
The Court: 
Maybe that is not a fair question. 
The Witness: 
We wouldn't have the competitor 
The Court: 
If they are not around to compete, maybe that 
is the difference. You may step down." 
The fact_that these respondents were "around to compete" and 
that they established the competition at a time they were 
employed by appellant and through the use of appellant's 
Proprietary information (or the non-use and destruction of 
the proprietary information that prevented appellant's use 
of it) are critical facts pointing to extensive damages in 
this case. 
Appellant's good will, its established procedures for 
documentation relating to future water works sales, its inventory 
-17-
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listings and sales projections were indisputably prop · 
netar· 
Abbott Redmont Thinli te Corporation, supra, at 89. Whether 
Dahle either prepared, maintained or had custody of the for: 
going documents during the course of his employment, it is 
axiomatic that the former employee respondents were at leas: 
expected to prepare the same accurately and perform their 
services in a manner reasonably calculated to maintain the 
business of the appellant at the expected level. Upon the 
court 1 s finding that the employee respondents breached thei: 
responsibilities to appellant in diverting items of busines: 
to Plumber Supply, it was incumbent upon the court to make 
a determination that the respondents breached their respon· 
sibilities with respect to the treatment of the proprietary 
information which they possessed and with respect to the 
fiduciary obligation under which they performed. The maiiir 
of a notice by respondents implying a new telephone number 
and promising continuing good service were at the very leas: 
an improper, if not illegal appropriation of the good will 
of appellant. That act was certainly a breach of their dut] 
of loyalty to the appellant as their employer. Similarly, 
the destruction and breakdown of appellant 1 s established 
documentation procedures through the removal and destructior. 
of documents, e.g., sales manuals, computer print outs, cata· 
. intent logs, by one or more of the respondents ev1dences an 
to hinder the continuance of appellant's business. Further, 
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the purchasing of apparently equivalent inventories for 
appellant and PlumbexsSupply at a time when respondents 
knew that they were leaving the employ of the appellant 
is additional independent evidence of an intention to injure 
appellant's business rather than maximizing the soundness 
of appellant's business pursuant to their fiduciary 
obligations. 
The lower court's limited analysis completely 
avoids the fact that appellant was an established supplier 
in the market and that Plumbers Supply was, at least for 
competitive purposes in the water works area, a new entrant. 
It also avoids the fact that the respondent employees were 
in a position which required their loyalty to the appellant 
rather than to Plumbers Supply. The findings of the trial 
court and the evidence contained in the record compel a 
conclusion that the respondents conspired to injure appellant; 
therefore, they should be required to fully compensate the 
appellant for the harmful effects of their conspiracy. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING APPELLANT 
TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS AND OTHER DAMAGES 
WHICH NATURALLY FOLLOWED FROM THE RESPONDENTS' ACTIONS. 
The measure of damages in the instant case has 
been settle dby this court in the case of Hoggan & Hall & 
Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, supra. In the Hoggan case this Court 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
affirmed an award of damages for loss of anticipated pro-
fits from projected sales. The Court states: 
"To say that the company lost nothing by the 
hypothecation of such accounts because the 
~ompany wa~ having some financial difficulty 
~s to fly ~n the teeth of logic, -- those 
very accounts may have been the difference 
between corporate survival or death." 
414 P.2d at 92. 
The court below failed to award damages for loss 
of anticipated profits resulting from expected and projectt 
sales. In tort actions the common measure of damages to bt 
assessed against all joint tort feasors includes all damage' 
incurred as a natural consequence of the defendants' actior.' 
In Beverly v. McCullick, 211 Kan. 87, 505 P.2d 624 (1973), 
damages were held proper where the defendant conspired to 
injure plaintiff's livestock auction business, the court 
stated: 
"Conspiracy is a tort and all injuries and 
losses that are the natural and probable 
results of wrongful and tortious acts are 
recoverable." 505 P.2d at 633. 
The losses suffered by appellant extend far beyor.c 
the damages awarded in the court below. The respondent· 
conspirators, acting to impair the future ability of appell> 
to compete with them, actively diverted business from appell' 
resigned from appellant's employment en mass, made use of 
privileged and proprietary information of appellant to com· 
d destro'<' pete against appellant in gaining new customers, an ' 
valuable property belonging to the appellant. The overall 
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effect of these actions on appellant's business was testi-
fied to by the witness Mr, Bray. He concluded that appell-
~t's water works business was drastically off beginning in 
May and extending through June. He fu~ther testified that, 
but for the acts of respondents, the period in which impact 
from lost sales would have been felt would not have been for 
ninety days. The appellant suffered a loss of ability to 
fill present contracts as well as compete for future contracts.* 
Where such acts on the part of the respondents as indicated 
above have been shown, the proper compensation for the appell-
ant far exceeds the damages awarded by the court below. 
The proper measure of damages was explained in 
Duane Jones, Co. , supra, as follows: 
"If plaintiff established wrongful conduct 
by defendants as alleged in the amended 
complaint--and the jury found that it did--
it was entitled to recover as damages the 
amount of loss sustained by it, including 
opportunities for profit on the accounts 
diverted from it through defendants' conduct." 
117 N.E.2d at 247. 
The proper measure of damages in the instant case 
includes the losses, proven at trial, for the months of May 
through July together with the damages sustained in the remainder 
of the 12 month period following the tortious conduct of 
respondents. At trial these latter damages could only be 
projected whereas upon remand they can be more precisely 
established. 
*It has been over a year and appellant still has not recovered 
the business set backs caused by the respondents' actions. 
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The proper measure of damages must be determined 
by the Court upon a review of the evidence. Uncertainty as 
to the amount of damages is not a basis for denying damages, 
Reid v. Mass, 155 Cal. App.2d 293,318 P.2d 54 (Dist. Ct. 
App. 1957), reh denied, (1957), hearing denied, (1958). 
In the Reid case, former employees of plaintiff initiated a 
competing business enploying additional former employees 
of plaintiff and solicitated business from plaintiff's 
customers through the use of proprietary information gain~ 
while employed by plaintiff. The defendants alleged that 
no precise determination of damages could be made and there· 
fore, there was no sufficient basis to award consequential 
damages. The court held to the contrary saying: 
"[I] t is clear that some damage to plaintiff's 
business was being caused by defendant and 
'one whose wrongful conduct has rendered diffi· 
cult the ascertainment of the damages cannot 
escape liability because the damages could not 
be measured with an exactness." (Citation 
omitted.) 318 P.2d at 64. 
It is apparent that the court below did not find 
consequential damages or lost profits from respondents' bre: 
of responsibilities since respo~dents' sales were made thro: 
competitive bidding. The court therefore apparently foun' 
that despite the collective action and breaches of respon· 
sibility against appellant in violation of their fiduciarY 
duty, as alleged, respondents in any event could do no more 
t~ 
than bid in the market place. It is submitted, however' 
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the focus of the court was required to be directed at the 
damages appellant suffered through respondents' action and 
not upon the fruits respondents' expected therefrom. Hoggan, 
supra, at 92. 
Based on these principles of law concerning the 
rreas.J[eOf compensatory damages for the conunission of torts, 
we trial court erred in not granting damages for the loss 
of business and business opportunities that were suffered 
by the appellant as a consequence of the respondents' actions. 
Therefore, the case should be remanded to the court below 
for a determination of the amount of loss suffered by app-
ellant and an award to appellant based on that finding. 
POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS 
PERFORMED UNLAWFUL ACTS PROVIDES SUFFICIENT BASIS TO AWARD 
APPELLANT PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
The court below acted contrary to the evidence in 
refusing to award appellant punitive damages based on the 
actions of the respondents. The lower court reviewed and 
approved the granting of a temporary restraining order. It 
also specifically found that respondents had diverted some 
of appellant's orders and had improperly taken certain mat-
erials belonging to appellant. Implicit in this finding is 
the finding of unlawful intention to hinder and destroy 
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appellants' ability to compete. It is well settled law 
that where conspirators act with malice, the plaintiff 
is entitled to an award of punitive damages. (See. e.g. 
Beverly v. McCullick, supra, at 634 (1973), SouthemCal. 
Disinfecting v. Lomkins, supra at 56 .) The fact that 
the respondents knew their actions to be wrongful but 
nonetheless wantonly carried them out is an adequate basis 
for awarding punitive damages. This has been expressed as 
follows: 
"There must be, in order to justify punitive 
damages, some element of wantonness of bad 
motive, but if one intentionally does a 
wrongful act and knows at the time that it 
is wrong, he does it wantonly and with bad 
motive." Mills v. Murray, 472 S.W.2d 6, 
17 (Mo. App. 1971) 
There is substantial evidence in the record showir.: 
malice on the part of respondents. For instance, the acts 
of destroying plaintiff's records, diverting orders to a 
competitor, solicitating of appellant's customers while 
still employed by appellant, entering a business competing ' 
with appellant before the termination of their employment 
with appellant, and their simultaneous resignation, all point 
to such malice. 
Utah case law approves punitive damages when the 
defendant has acted maliciously or with intent to injure the 
plaintiff. This court stated in Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 
1 
2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963), that: 
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"w"hether [punitive] damages are awardable 
is not dependent upon the classification 
of the wrongful act, not upon the nature 
of the injury, but upon the manner and 
intent with which it is done. If the 
wrongful act by which one injures another 
is done willfully and maliciously, our law 
allows the imposition of punitive damages 
as a punishment to the defendant for such 
conduct and as a warning to him and others 
against it. 379 P.2d at 382. 
The record is sufficiently clear that the respondents in the 
instant case sought to damage appellant's ability to compete. 
This is aggravated by the fiduciary position of the respondent 
employees and the breach of their duty in that regard. The 
activities of Zarbock and Plumbers Supply both in conspiring 
to compete unfairly with appellant and in conspiring with 
the employee-respondents to breach their duty to appellant 
constitute intentional and wanton action. The various 
actions of the employee-respondents were performed maliciously 
and intentionally. 
The court below failed to review the actions of 
the respondents in the context of their fiduciary obligation 
and the conspiracy in which they participated. Consequently, 
the court was unable to fully appreciate the seriousness of 
their conduct and has not considered the complete basis for 
awarding punitive damages. 
Based on the unusual facts of this case and the 
outrageous actions of the respondents conduct, this cause 
should be remanded to the court below with instructions to 
award appellant such punitive damages as may be found equitable. 
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SUMMARY 
The proveable misconduct of the various 
responder,: 
may well be only the tip of an iceberg. Two specific acts 
of diverting business to respondent Plumbers Supply away 
from appellant may be only two of many such acts perpetrate;, 
by respondent-employees prior to their departure from appell 
The items found destroyed may well be only a small portion 
of materials belonging to appellant which respondents dest· 
royed. 
Certainly several facts pointing to the rest of 
the iceberg were proven. Respondents Zarbock and Dahle ex· 
pected in the first few months of operation of an essentiali: 
new business to have the same sales as appellant had pro-
j ected for the same period. Surpri zingly, they carne very 
close. Appellant expected after the loss of key employees 
to feel the decline only after ninety days. It carne instan:! 
Appellant found a great many important documents and catalom 
missing which no one can account for. 
The facts of this case clearly demonstrate that 
appellant is entitled to more than lost profits on the 
two items found diverted. It is entitled to its lost profit: 
on all lost sales. The relief through injunction might have 
helped. Now that relief would not help appellant but onlY 
punish respondents. The better route is to now give app-
ellant its lost profits for the period from May 1976 toMaY 
-26-
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1977. In addition, it is entitled to punitive damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
K·rton, McConkie, Boyer & Boyle 
36 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-3680 
KENNETH SCHNAPER 
Crane Company 
300 Park Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I herewith and hereby certify that a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was placed 
in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, with 
postage thereon fully prepaid, this l~day of June, 
1977, addressed as follows: 
Richard S. Nemelka 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 401 
455 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
susa~ure 
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